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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) and Article VIII, § 3, Utah 
Constitution. This case is a consolidation of two appeals from the 
Third Judicial District Court, wherein Judge David Young granted 
summary judgment in favor of the respondents herein. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
For purposes of this appeal, this respondent does not 
contest the statement of issues set forth in appellant's brief. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
[N]o state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person in its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. 
All political power is inherent in the people 
and all free governments are founded on their 
authority for their equal protection and 
benefit, and they have the right to alter or 
reform their government as the public welfare 
may require. 
Utah Const, art. I § 2. 
All courts shall be open, and every person for 
an injury done to him in his person, property 
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course 
of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay; and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any trial in this State, by himself or 
1 
counsel, in any civil cause to which he is a 
party. 
Utah Const, art. I § 11. 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
Utah Const, art. I § 24. 
The provisions of this Constitution are 
mandatory and prohibitory unless by express 
words they are declared to be otherwise. 
Utah Const, art. I § 26. 
Injury due to defective design or construction 
of improvement to real property — Within seven 
years. — No action to recover damages for any 
injury to property, real or personal, or for 
any injury to the person, or for bodily injury 
or wrongful death, arising out of the defective 
and unsafe condition of an improvement to real 
property, nor any action for damages sustained 
on account of such injury, shall be brought 
against any person performing or furnishing the 
design, planning, supervision of construction 
or constructing of such improvement to real 
property more than seven years after the 
completion of construction. 
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual, 
corporation, partnership, or any other legal 
entity. 
(2) Completion of construction for the purpose 
of this act shall mean the date of issuance of 
a certificate of substantial completion by the 
owner, architect, engineer or other agent, or 
the date of the owner's use or possession of 
the improvement on real property. 
The limitation imposed by this provision shall 
not apply to any person in actual possession 
and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of 
the improvement at the time the defective and 
unsafe condition of such improvement consti-
tutes the proximate cause of the injury for 
which it is proposed to bring an action. 
2 
This provision shall not be construed as 
extending or limiting the period otherwise 
prescribed by laws of this state for the 
bringing of any action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal taken from Judge David S. Young's order 
granting summary judgment against the plaintiff, James Sanchez, and 
in favor of defendants Martin Stern, Jr. AIA & Associates, Okland 
Construction Company, Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc. and Higham-Hilton 
Mechanical Contractors, Inc. (For purposes of this brief, Higham-
Hilton Mechanical Contractors, Inc., shall be referred to as 
"Higham-Hilton.") 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
For purposes of this appeal, respondent Higham-Hilton 
accepts the statement of facts set forth in appellant Sanchez' 
brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the interest of avoiding unnecessary duplication, 
respondent Higham-Hilton incorporates by reference the arguments 
raised by co-respondents Martin Stern, Jr., AIA Architect & 
Associates, Rocky Mountain Pools, Inc., and Okland Construction 
Company with respect to the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-25.5. However, Higham-Hilton does not incorporate such 
3 
arguments to the extent that they assert or imply that manu-
facturers, suppliers, materialmen, and others involved in the 
building industry are not included within the scope of the statute. 
No issue of material fact exists with respect to whether 
respondent Higham-Hilton falls within the scope of Utah Code Ann § 
78-12-25.5. Even assuming that Higham-Hilton provided the alleged-
ly defective sauna heating unit, appellant's cause of action 
nonetheless arises out of an allegedly defective improvement to 
real property, rather than a defective "product." Furthermore, as 
mechanical contractor for the Little America project, Higham-Hilton 
is expressly included within the coverage of § 78-12-25.5, and 
appellant's causes of action against it are barred. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 DOES NOT 
VIOLATE THE OPEN COURTS PROVISION OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, NOR DOES IT 
VIOLATE PRINCIPLES OF DUE PROCESS AND 
EQUAL PROTECTION. 
In the interest of brevity, respondent Higham-Hilton 
incorporates and adopts the arguments set forth in the briefs of 
respondents Martin Stern, Jr. AIA Architect & Associates, Rocky 
Mountain Pools, Inc., and Okland Construction Company concerning 
the constitutionality of § 78-12-25.5. However, Higham-Hilton does 
not incorporate those arguments to the extent that they assert or 
imply that manufacturers, suppliers, materialmen, and others in the 
building industry do not fall within the scope of the statute. 
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Higham-Hilton submits that such an assumption is unwarranted under 
the language and legislative history of the statute. 
Higham-Hilton also submits that appellant Sanchez does 
not have standing to assert the rights of third parties with 
respect to the constitutionality of § 78-12-25.5. Sanchez7 sole 
constitutional argument on equal protection grounds is that the 
statute in question protects certain members of the construction 
industry, while excepting owners and others in the industry from 
its protection. While a blanket statement as to the coverage of 
the statute appears unwarranted, even if appellant were correct, he 
would not have standing to assert the rights of those allegedly 
disadvantaged third parties. 
The inappropriateness of allowing appellant to assert 
those third parties7 rights is particularly clear in this case, 
given the fact that appellant's equal protection argument can 
prevail only if he can establish that the parties are not protected 
by the statute. If it were determined that those third parties are 
indeed covered by the statute, plaintiff would be entitled to no 
recovery, as each of the defendants (other than Little America) 
would be protected by the statute itself. In that regard, appel-
lant clearly does not represent the interests of the third parties, 
and therefore lacks standing to raise the equal protection argument 
set forth in his brief. 
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II. NO ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS AS TO 
WHETHER UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.5 
APPLIES TO HIGHAM-HILTON. 
Appellant argues that summary judgment for Higham-Hilton 
was inappropriate because a factual issue exists with respect to 
Higham-Hilton's role in the construction of the Little America. 
Specifically, Appellant suggests that Higham-Hilton might not fall 
within the protection of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 because it 
allegedly did not construct an improvement, but rather provided a 
defective product. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 28-29) As explained 
to the district court, appellant's argument centers on the theory 
that the allegedly defective heating unit would not "fit the 
definition of improvement and the statute of limitation wouldn't 
apply . . . ." (Transcript of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, July 18, 1988, p. 8). Assuming, for purposes of 
this appeal, that Higham-Hilton provided the heating unit which 
allegedly caused appellant's injuries, appellant's argument 
nonetheless fails as a matter of law. 
A. Appellant's claims arise out of an 
allegedly defective "improvement to 
real property." 
Appellant Sanchez contends that his claims arise out of 
an allegedly defective heating unit, which Higham-Hilton will 
assume it provided. Consequently, appellant argues, his claims 
against Higham-Hilton arise out of a defective "product," and are 
not governed by § 78-12-25.5. In support of that theory, appellant 
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quotes the definition of improvement set forth in Kallas Millwork 
Corp, v. Square DCo,, 66 Wis.2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975). 
The court in Kallas applied what has become known as the 
"common sense" test for determining what constitutes an improvement 
to real property. As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, 
"[m]ost courts in other jurisdictions, construing statutes similar 
to [Ohio's] have adopted a common sense interpretation of 'improve-
ment,' rather than employing fixture law." Adair v. Koppers Co., 
Inc., 741 F.2d 111, 113 (6th Cir. 1984). Under a common sense view 
of the term "improvement to real property," courts have recognized 
that a component integral to the operation of a larger system is 
necessarily inseparable from that larger system within the meaning 
of "improvement." In this case, the heating unit is obviously an 
integral and necessary part of the sauna, which unquestionably 
constitutes an "improvement" under any given definition. As such, 
the heating unit itself constitutes an improvement for purposes of 
§ 78-12-25.5, and claims based upon the unit are therefore governed 
by the statute. 
A leading case recognizing that principle is Mullis v. 
Southern Company Services, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 579 (Ga. 1982). In 
Mullis, the plaintiff was injured by an air circuit breaker 
contained in a power company's electrical system. The defendant, 
who was alleged to have designed (and apparently constructed) the 
electrical system, was granted summary judgment based upon a 
statute of repose essentially identical to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-
7 
25.5.L Rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the circuit breaker 
was not an improvement within the meaning of the statute, the court 
wrote: 
The issue is whether a component of a system 
which is definitely an improvement to real 
property is an improvement to real property 
itself. However, to artificially extract each 
component from an improvement to real property 
and view it in isolation would be an unrealis-
tic and impractical method of determining what 
is an improvement to real property. Frequent-
ly, as in this case, an improvement to real 
property is going to consist of a complex 
system of components. 
Consequently, we find that if a component 
is an essential or integral part of the 
improvement to which it belongs, then it is 
itself an improvement to real property. 
Id. at 584. 
A similar conclusion was reached in Cudahv Co. v. Ragnar 
Benson, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Colo. 1981). In that case, an 
allegedly defective header cap within a refrigeration system caused 
damage to the plaintiff's property. Based upon Colorado's statute 
1
 "[Georgia] Code Ann. § 3-1006 provides as follows: 
'No action to recover damages 
(1) for any deficiency in the survey or plat, planning, 
design, specifications, supervision or observation of construction 
or construction of an improvement to real property, 
(2) for injury to property, real or personal, arising out 
of any such deficiency, or 
(3) injury to the person or for wrongful death arising 
out of any such deficiency, shall be brought against any person 
performing the furnishing the survey or plat, design, planning, 
supervision or observation of construction, or construction of such 
an improvement more than eight years after substantial completion 
of such an improvement.'11 Id. at 581. 
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of repose governing improvements to real property,2 the court 
granted summary judgment to the general contractor and a sub-
contractor responsible for the refrigeration system. The court 
noted that the size or interchangeability of the cap was not 
determinative of its status under the statute. Because the cap was 
an integral component of the refrigeration system, which was itself 
essential to the overall structure of the plant, the court found 
that the header cap was an improvement to real property under the 
statute. Accordingly, the plaintiff's claims were held barred. 
In this case, the inappropriateness of severing the 
heating unit from the entire sauna structure is demonstrated by the 
specific allegations which appellant Sanchez makes in his second 
amended complaint. The allegations against Higham-Hilton are 
hereafter reproduced in total: 
(a) Failing to build the sauna with an adequate 
timing mechanism which would alert users to the amount of time they 
have used the sauna; 
2
 "C.R.S. 1973, § 13-80-127, provides in pertinent part: 
(1) All actions against any architect, contractor, 
engineer, or inspector brought to recover damages for injury to 
person or property caused by the design, planning, supervision, 
inspection, construction, or observation of construction of any 
improvement to real property shall be brought within two years 
after the claim for relief arises, and not thereafter, but in no 
case shall such an action be brought more than ten years after the 
substantial completion of the improvement to the real property . . 
." Id. at 1215. 
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(b) Failing to build the sauna with adequate 
warnings of side effects accompanying use of the sauna; 
(c) Failing to build the sauna with adequate 
disclosure to the purchasers of the dangers to users in using the 
sauna for an extended period of time; 
(d) Failing to build the sauna with other safety 
precautions which will become obvious through discovery. 
(R.78) 
Plainly, Sanchez claims concern the entire sauna. 
Interesting is the fact that none of the allegations actually refer 
to the heating unit; rather, they refer to the sauna as a unit. He 
cannot seek to avoid application of § 78-12-25.5 by isolating each 
constituent of the sauna and designating it a "product." Such an 
approach was recently rejected by the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, applying a "common sense interpretation of 'improvement'" 
in construing the terms of Ohio's real property statute of repose.3 
"The statute states in relevant part: 
No action to recover damages . . 
for bodily injury or wrongful 
death, arising out of the defective 
and unsafe condition of an improve-
ment to real property, . . . shall be 
brought against any person performing 
services for or furnishing the 
design, planning, supervision of 
construction, or construction of such 
improvement to real property, more 
than ten years after the performance 
or furnishing of such services and 
construction. Ohio Rev.Code § 
2305.131." IcL. at 112-13 (court's 
omissions). 
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In Adair, supra, the plaintiff was injured by an allegedly defec-
tive conveyor on which coal was transported within a coal-process-
ing plant. Based upon the statute of repose, the district court 
granted summary judgment to the company who had designed and built 
the conveyor and the entire plant. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
With respect to the plaintiff's claim that the conveyor itself was 
not an improvement, the court wrote: 
Adair has attempted to limit the focus of this 
inquiry to Conveyor A, or even to the pulley 
and belt involved in Adair7s accident. Such 
components are arguably in the nature of 
equipment, rather than improvements. Adair's 
proposed limitation is too narrow, however. . . 
[T]he nature of the conveyor can best be 
understood in light of its "integral" role in 
the coal handling system. 
* * * 
The coal handling system, which transports 
raw material to processing facilities, is 
essential to the operation of the factory as 
designed and enhances the utility of the 
property. 
Id. at 114-15. Accordingly, the court held that the component 
constituted an improvement to real property, and that the plain-
tiff's claims were barred. 
The key factor in determining whether appellant's action 
arises out of an allegedly defective "improvement," rather than an 
allegedly defective "product," as appellant contends, is an 
examination of the heating unit's role with respect to the sauna, 
11 
and, in turn, the sauna's role within the Little America project. 
In J. H. Westerman Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. , 499 A.2d 
116 (D.C.App. 1985), the plaintiff sued for damages caused by an 
allegedly defective heat-activated "off switch." The appellate 
court affirmed judgment for the defendant based upon the applicable 
statute of repose,4 concluding that the switch constituted an 
improvement to real property: 
[T]he heating system, including its component 
Klixon switches, was an "improvement to real 
property." The built-in heating system was an 
integral part of the building, without which 
the structure could not have been used for 
business. . . . Furthermore, the Klixon 
switches are an integral part of the heating 
system. 
In this case, it is undisputed that without the heating 
unit, the sauna could not function. It is also unquestionable that 
the sauna is an improvement within the definition offered by 
appellant. Under the common sense analysis applied in the above 
4
 "The statute provides: 
Actions arising out of death or injury caused by 
defective or unsafe improvements to real property. 
(a)(1) . . . [A]ny action— 
(A) to recover damages for— 
(i) personal injury, 
(ii) injury to real or personal property, or 
(iii) wrongful death, 
resulting from the defective or unsafe condi-
tion of an improvement to real property, . . . 
shall be barred unless in the case where injury is the basis of 
such action, such injury occurs within the ten-year period begin-
ning on the date the improvement was substantially completed, or in 
the case where death is the basis of such action, either such death 
or the injury in such death occurs within such ten-year period. . . 
." Id. at 118. 
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cases, therefore, an action based upon an alleged defect in the 
sauna heating unit necessarily arises out of a defective improve-
ment to real property, rather than a defective product. Conse-
quently, the action is governed by § 78-12-25.5, and the products 
liability claim apparently anticipated by appellant cannot be 
maintained. The Supreme Court of Mississippi recently reached that 
conclusion in the context of a virtually identical statute of 
repose.5 In Moore v. Jesco, Inc., 531 So. 2d 815, 817 (Miss. 
1988), the court held that claims against the supplier of allegedly 
defective chicken house components arose out of an improvement to 
real property, and thus were barred by the statute: 
In Smith v. Fluor Corp., 514 So.2d 1227 (Miss. 
1987), this Court held that § 15-1-41 applied 
to a heat exchanger installed in a refinery 
because the heat exchanger was an improvement 
to real property rather than a product. . . . 
In the context of the case at bar, whether § 
15-1-41 protects suppliers of products and/or 
materialmen becomes immaterial if the item 
^
 f,MCA § 15-1-41, as it existed when this action was filed, 
stated in part: 
No action may be brought to recover damages for 
injury to property, real or personal 
arising out of any deficiency in the design, 
planning, supervision or observation of 
construction, or construction of an improvement 
to real property . . . against any person, firm 
or corporation performing or furnishing the 
design, planning, supervision of construction 
or construction of such improvement to real 
property ore than ten (10) years after the 
written acceptance or actual occupancy or use, 
whichever occurs first, of such improvement by 
the owner thereof." Id. at 817 (court's 
omissions). 
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supplied is not a product. Based on our 
analysis in Smith v. Flour Tsic] Corp., supra, 
we hold that the component parts of the subject 
chicken houses constitute "improvements to real 
property" and not "products." As a matter of 
law, then, an action based on strict products 
liability will not lie and summary judgment was 
properly granted. 
In this case, appellant's claims arise out of an alleged-
ly defective improvement to real property. Consequently, the 
claims are governed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5, and are barred 
by the provisions of that statute. 
B. Higham-Hilton is within the scope of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 for all 
claims arising out of the Little 
America construction project. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 provides in part that an 
action arising out of the allegedly defective or unsafe condition 
of an improvement to real property "may not be brought against any 
person performing or furnishing the design, planning, surveying, 
supervising the construction of, or constructing the improvement to 
real property more than seven years after the completion of 
construction." In spite of the plain language of the statute, 
appellant apparently contends that the statute includes contractors 
who do not provide materials incidental to their contracts, but 
does not include contractors who do provide such materials. 
Appellant's attempt to create exceptions to the statute 
is groundless, and constitutes an improper attempt to usurp a 
legislative function. To quote the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals, "When Congress sought to exclude a particular class from 
14 
the operation of § 12-310, it did so expressly: the statute in 
explicit terms excludes owners or possessors from the application 
of § 12-310." J. H. Westerman Co., supra, at 120. Like Congress, 
the Utah state legislature expressed its intent to except owners 
from operation of the statute of repose. Appellant's assertion 
that the legislature failed to mention an entire class meant to be 
excluded — contractors whose bids include materials — is unsup-
portable in light of the statute. 
Appellant's argument also fails on a more fundamental 
ground, however. It has been undisputed throughout the course of 
this litigation that Higham-Hilton served as the mechanical 
subcontractor on the Little America construction project. In fact, 
appellant has consistently characterized Higham-Hilton as such in 
his pleadings and other court documents. (R.51, 78-81; Brief of 
Appellant, p. 6) As mechanical contractor, Higham-Hilton was 
responsible for "the plumbing, heating, and the air conditioning" 
for the entire Little America project. (Deposition of Stanley 
Nakamura, June 28, 1988, p. 12, lines 13-18.) 
Higham-Hilton would be no less a mechanical contractor if 
it provided a product in the performance of its duties on the 
project. The court in Cudahy, supra, recognized that basic 
principle. Holding that a particular defendant was "within the 
class afforded the special protection" of the statute of repose, 
the court wrote: 
The October 17, 1972, agreement between Cudahy 
and Ragnar Benson confirms the allegation that 
15 
Ragnar Benson was general contractor of the 
addition to the plant, performing engineering, 
architectural, supervisory and other related 
services. The fact that Ragnar Benson also had 
a contractual duty to supply some materials 
does not take it out of the protected class. 
Id. at 1215. 
The result reached in Cudahy is a logical and necessary 
interpretation of the statute of repose. If plaintiffs could avoid 
application of the statute by alleging that a contractor also 
supplied products on a particular project, the statute would 
provide essentially no protection to a majority of subcontractors. 
Bids almost always include labor and materials pursuant to the 
owner's bid documents. To exclude contractors7 protection to the 
extent they provide materials necessary to fulfill their main role 
as builders would eviscerate the protection of the statute and 
violate the clear legislative intent. In interpreting the statute, 
this court should seek to fulfill its purpose, which is to provide 
contractors and others in the building industry with some measure 
of protection against long-term threat of liability. 
In KSLA-TV, Inc. v. Radio Corp. of America, 501 F.Supp. 
891 (W.D.La. 1981), opinion adopted in KSLA-TV, Inc. v. Radio Corp. 
of America. 693 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1982), the court recognized the 
need to apply a similar statute of repose in accordance with its 
intended purpose. The defendant in that case contracted to 
construct a radio tower, and also served on the project as 
"materialmen and manufacturer of component parts.11 Id. at 893. 
Thirteen years later, the tower collapsed and the plaintiff filed 
16 
suit. The defendant moved for summary judgment based upon the 
statute of repose governing improvements to real property.6 In 
response, the plaintiff argued that the statute did not apply to 
the defendant in its capacities as materialman and manufacturer. 
The court rejected the plaintiff's argument: 
The objectives of § 2772 would be frustrated if 
this court were to allow suit against Stainless 
in its capacities as materialmen and manufac-
turer of component parts. 
The statute's purpose of preventing 
hardships to contractors cannot be attained if 
a court allows the same claim to proceed 
against the same contractor in his capacity of 
materialman or manufacturer or provider of 
component parts. With these principles in 
mind, this court concludes that the legisla-
ture, in enacting § 2772, could not have 
intended to preempt causes of action against 
contractors who do not also serve as material-
men or manufacturers of component parts, yet 
allow causes of action to proceed against 
b
 "§ 2772. Pre-emptive period for actions involving defici-
encies in design, supervision or construction of improvements to 
immovable. 
A. No action whether ex contractu, ex delicto or 
otherwise, to recover on a contract or to recover damages shall be 
brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, 
planning, supervision, inspection or observation of construction or 
the construction of an improvement to immovable property: 
(1) More than ten years after the date of registry 
in the mortgage office of acceptance of the work by owner . . . 
B. The causes which are pre-empted within the time 
described above include any action: . . . 
(1) For any deficiency in the design, planning, 
inspection, supervision or observation of construction or in the 
construction of an improvement to immovable property; 
(2) For damage to property, movable or immovable, 
arising out of any such deficiency; 
(3) For injury to the person or for wrongful death 
arising out of any such deficiency . . . " Id. at 892. 
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contractors who do serve in such dual capaci-
ties. 
Id. at 897-98. 
A similar attempt to isolate a defendant's role within a 
larger project was addressed in Hilliard v. Lummus Co., Inc., 834 
F.2d 1352 (7th Cir. 1987). In Hilliard, the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals noted that a defendant's status under a statute of 
repose must be determined by viewing "as a whole11 the defendant's 
role in the construction project. The plaintiff in that case was 
injured by an allegedly defective screw conveyor used to move cocoa 
through a cocoa processing plant. As part of his contract to 
"modernize" the plant, the defendant had recommended certain 
changes in the screw conveyors. Based upon the Illinois statute of 
repose governing improvements to real property,7 the district 
court granted summary judgment for the defendant, and the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed, stating: 
Hilliard's focus on the screw conveyor alone 
ignores the true nature of the Lummus Co.'s 
work for WFC. Lummus did suggest improvements 
in the screw conveyors, but also directed a 
1
 "Section 13-214(b) [of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure] 
provided that: 
No action based on tort, contract or 
otherwise may be brought against any 
person for an act or omission of such 
person in the design, planning, 
supervision, observation or manage-
ment of construction, or construction 
of an improvement to real property 
after 12 years have elapsed from the 
time of such act or omission. . . . " 
Id. at 1354. 
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broad spectrum of improvements to the plant's 
cocoa-processing system. The appropriate 
inquiry is whether the whole of Lummus's work 
for WFC amounts to an improvement of real 
property. For example, in a case involving a 
plaintiff injured by a loose exterior brick, 
the question whether section 13-214(b) would 
apply to the architect of the building would 
not turn on whether the brick was an improve-
ment to real property, but rather on whether 
the entire building was an improvement to real 
property. 
Id. at 1356. 
The same conclusion is compelled under the wording of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5. Furthermore, denying application of § 
78-12-25.5 to contractors who also supply products would appear to 
contradict the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. 
On page 17 of the legislative history attached as an addendum to 
this Brief, Senator Buckner noted that the statute was needed 
because protection was currently unavailable to "contractors, 
subcontractors, suppliers, engineers or architects . . . " (Empha-
sis added.) From that language, it appears that even suppliers who 
do not participate in construction efforts might also have been 
intended to be within the scope of § 78-12-25.5. Given Higham-
Hilton's role as mechanical contractor on the Little America 
project, however, that issue need not be addressed. The undisputed 
fact that Higham-Hilton's primary role in the Little America 
project was mechanical contractor mandates application of the 
statute, regardless of whether it also supplied a product in the 
course of its performance. 
19 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, respondent Higham-Hilton 
requests the Court to affirm the order of summary judgment entered 
below. 
Dated this "SPw^ day of May, 1989. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
By "-TSAAA^j \ - ( ^ 
Lee C. Helrming 
Karra J . P o r t e r 
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l THE READING CLERK: House Bill #4 by Representative 
2 Phil Meecham and read: Enacting a new section 73-12-25.5, 
3 Subsection .5, Utah Code annotated 1953 relating to the 
* limitations of action by providing a time limit within 
5 which action for injury to property or death must be 
6 brought against persons who performed or furnished the 
7
 design, planning, supervision or construction of 
8
 improvements on real property. 
9
 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State 
10 of Utah, Section 1, section 78-12-25, Subsection .5. 
U Utah Code annotated 1953 is enacted to read: 73-12-25 
12 |] Subsection .5. No action to recover damages for any 
injury to property, real or personal, or for any injury 
to the person or for bodily injury or wrongful death 
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an 
13 
14 
15 
16 I improvement to real property, not any action for damages 
17 li sustained on account of such injuries shall be brought 
lfl || against any person performing or furnishing the design, 
19 I planning, supervision of construction or construction of 
20 I such improvement to real property more than 4 years after 
21 || the completion of construction. (1) Person shall mean 
an individual, corporation, partnership or any other 
legal entity. (2) Completion of construction shall 
22 
23 
24 mean that that time when the last material 
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has been furnished and the last labor performed 
including all necessary small jobs incidental to the 
3 I  completion of contractual obligations and incidental 
4 (J to making the improvement suitable for its intended 
use. The limitation imposed by this provision shall 
6 I  not apply to any person in actual possession and control 
7 as owner, tenant or otherwise of the improvement at the 
8 time the defective and unsafe condition of such 
9 improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury 
10 for which it is proposed to bring an action. This 
11 provision shall not be construed as extending or limiting 
12 I] the periods otherwise prescribed by the laws of this 
State for the bringing of any action. 
Mr. Speaker, your Committee on Business and 
15 I  Commerce to which was referred House Bill #4 by 
16 Rep. Hill et al, limitation of certain actions has 
17 carefully considered said bill and reports the same out 
18 favorably with the following amendments. Page 1, line 10, 
19 after the word "then" delete the word "four" and add the 
20 word "seven". Repeat: Page 1, line 10, after the word 
21 "then" delete the word "four" and add the word "seven". 
22 Respectfully, Representative Frank V, Nelson, Chairman. 
23 I THE CHAIR: Mr. Speaker, I move we adopt the 
24 committee report. 
13 
14 
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1 A VOICE: Moved and seconded to adopt the 
2 committee report, 
3 THE CHAIR: All in favor, say aye. (aye) Opposed 
4 say no. Committee report is adopted. House Bill #4 is 
5 before you and the Chair will recognize the chief 
6 sponsor of the Bill/ Representative Hill. 
7
 REP. HILL: Before we get too far into this, there 
8 has been passed an amendment which we propose to make in 
9 the beginning of line 14. This amendment was written up 
10 before we had the new line delineations on the Bill, and 
H I so the top two lines are a little bit in error. But the 
amendment is to begin, will replace the subsection 2, 
beginning at line 14, with the information that is going 
to be passed out just prior to the convening time at 
2 o'clock. Delete that entire paragraph there and replace 
it with the one written, "Completion of construction for 
the purposes of this act.shall mean the date of issuance 
of a Certificate, of substantial completion by the owner, 
architect, engineer or other agents, or the date of the 
owner's use or possession of the improvement on real 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 I property." 
22
 || THE CHAIR: It's been moved and seconded that we 
23 amend House Bill #4 by replacing subsection 2 with the 
24 new subsection as just read. All in favor of the motion 
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1 I say aye. (aye) Opposed say no. So ordered. The Bill 
2 is amended. Representative Hill. 
3 REP. .HILL: The reason for this is to get a little 
4 more clear meaning of this particular phrase, completion 
3- of construction as opposed to the one that was written, 
6 originally written in the Bill. We have a more less 
7 recognized principle of law -- Ifm not a lawyer, I guess 
8 1 shouldn't be speaking for all these lawyers -- but 
9 there is a recognized principle of law that holds that 
10 at some point there is a necessity for a time to be 
11 established when rights and obligations must be settled. 
12 Now this is recognized in the fact that we have many 
13 statutes of limitations defined by statute and law that 
H states that action in certain causes and certain cases 
15 must be brought before a certain date. There is a limit 
16 beyond which action cannot be brought. Well, this is a 
IT very sound and practical principle and itfs also a good 
18 business principle because at some time there must be a 
19 point at which obligations are considered settled. If 
20 youfve made an error or you've made a mistake, as a 
21 natural course, they're not held against you forever in 
22 most c a s e s . H o w e v e r , in the e n g i n e e r i n g and a r c h i t e c -
23 tural field this is not so, as defined so far as 
24 definition in the statutes are concerned. 
II P a S e 5 
1 The work that an engineer, an architect or contractor 
2 or supervisor performs by statute can be held against 
3 him for his entire life, and in some cases, have been 
4 brought against the estate of the man after he is 
5 deceased. 
6 Now it's recognized that that are some things 
7 that might enter into this from the standpoint that if 
8 you take away some -- if you give rights in one place, 
9 then you have to take them away from some other place. 
10 This is probably so, but you must make, you must 
U determine then, which will be for the good and best of 
12 all concerned* Now in this particular matter we have, 
13 it's been brought to our attention across the nation 
14 that it seems like wefve become a suit-conscious people 
15 to the extent that when an action is brought everyone 
16 that had any connection with it, even sometimes down to 
17 the janitor, have been entered in as a party to the 
18 suit* This has been true of many engineering firms and 
19 many engineering and architectural people where action 
20 has been brought years and years after they have completed 
21 their service, the facility has been in use and a cause 
22 for at least proposed negligence has been brought and 
23 the person who is responsible for the construction of 
24 the building in the original instance has been named as 
6 
9 
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1 || a party to the suit. Usually these have been able to 
2 be cleared but not until much time and energy has been 
3 extended on the part of that person that was responsible 
4 (I for that design* 
Now the fact that at some time this cutoff 
should be is recognized also in the Court because in 
7
 || some instances, in any kind of a suit, if the matter is 
8
 || too long past, they'll dismiss it because it's a stale 
case. Witnesses, memories, records are so far in the 
10 || time past that it's difficult to establish testimony, to 
11 I establish some of the things that might be necessary for 
12 || a Court determination in these, and these have been 
dismissed on this fact because they ruled there had been 
as a matter of equity in justice no attempts to rule on 
those. So this Bill, while it does get into a little 
bit different area in our legal field, in the fact that 
most actions start from the time they have been discovered 
18
 || or could have been discovered. This is the usual limita-
19
 I tion. This Bill says that the limitation shall start 
20 || from the time that the facility is completed or has been 
21
 || turned over to the owner or user, whoever the work was 
being performed for. The original Bill is written up 
for four years, which is a usual, which has been done in 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
22 
23 
24 many o t h e r S t a t e s but w e ' r e w i l l i n g to go wi th t h i s 7 -year 
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1 II program* In some States it's more and in others, it 
2 is less* Now this type of proposal is not new* We 
3 have many States that have enacted similar legislation 
4 J] recognizing the problem that it's created by having 
people on the hook, so to speak, for their entire 
6 II lifetime, I'll list you briefly the ones that have 
7 enacted statutes in this same area: Idaho, Illinois, 
8 Louisiana, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, 
9 Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia and Wisconsin* Idaho being 
10 the last, they passed one at their last Special Session 
11 just a year ago* And so we're asking for this considera< 
12 tion to the people that are involved in the construction 
13 and design business that this type of thing might be 
14 enacted* I think Mr* Meecham, Representative Meecham, 
15 has some other areas to bring in on the legal side of 
16 the thing and an explanation of the "why" of this Bill. 
17 I'd entertain any questions and any answer concerning 
18 questions that may be in the minds of some of the 
19 representatives on the floor* 
20 THE CHAIR: Is there a question? 
21 (Inaudible) 
22 Rep. Arbuckle? 
23 REP. ARBUCKLE: Representative Hill will yield to 
24 a question? 
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I I  REP. ; ELL: Yes, sir* 
2. REP* ARBUCKLE: You were mentioning some of these 
Z other States that have enacted this type of legislation. 
4 I) What is the length of time most of them have for the 
time they're held accountable for? 
6 I  REP. HILL: I can read those. Idaho set theirs 
7 at 9 years; Illinois at 6 years; Lousiana at 10; 
a Minnesota 10; New Hampshire, 6; North Carolina 6; 
9 Ohio 10; Tennessee 4; Virginia 5; and Wisconsin 6. 
10 We're about in the same area. 
11 REP. ARBUCKLE: No further questions. 
12 THE CHAIR: Are you ready for the question on 
13 House Bill 4? Representative Simpson. 
14 REP. SIMPSON: Will Rep. Hill yield to a question? 
15 REP. HILL: Representative Hill will yield to the 
16 question. 
17 REP* SIMPSON: In reference to other agents, would 
18 these be other agents of the owner or the architect or 
19 the engineer, the way this has been written? 
20 REP. HILL: The owner in some cases can have a 
21 superintending, a construction supervisor who would be 
22 authorized to do this. This would be agent of either. 
23 So anyone -- someone would be authorized to make a 
24 signature regarding this certificate of completion. 
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1 REP. SIMPSON: May I question further, Mr. Speaker? 
2 HEP. HILL: State your question. 
3 The biggest difficulty was between the owner and 
4 I the engineer that the engineer1s agents release the 
engineer from this contention? 
THE CHAIR: Rep. Hill? 
REP. HILL: Let me clarify the one point concerning 
this completion of construction. This is a standard 
document used in the construction trade but not always, 
and just merely recognizes that the facility has been 
completed. This doesn't relieve anyone from any action. 
It just indicates that the facility has been completed 
according to whatever prearranged agreement was made 
and that certain work has now concluded. 
REP. SIMPSON: One final question, if I may. 
REP. HILL: State your question* 
REP. SIMPSON: Have you ever known, Representative 
Hill, of a case where an owner got fed up, shall we say, 
in waiting for these people to finish his home, and by 
necessity because his other home has been sold, had to 
move into this building incompleted and this then would 
cut him off? 
THE CHAIR: Representative Hill. 
REP. HILL: There are probably some circumstances 
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involving this that are surely true, to the extent 
that a contractor and owner relationship is probably 
not on firm ground in the beginning, where perhaps this 
could be. The mere fact that he has taken possession 
would indicate that some other arrangements had been 
made, I would presume, but I don't think we could cover 
all of these situations by this particular statement* 
THE CHAIR: Are you ready for the question on 
House Bill 4? Rep. Carr. 
REP. CARR: Will Representative Hill yield? 
THE CHAIR: Submit the question. 
REP. HILL: Ifll yield. 
REP. CARR: I had a couple of questions. As I 
understand the Bill, the 7-year statute of limitations 
would apply, regardless of the question of when the 
defective condition was discovered. 
REP. HILL: This is correct. 
REP. CARR: Now as I understand, Ifm not well 
acquainted with a statute of this type, but I understand 
that in some States, some of the laws provide that the 
time runs from the discovery of the defect or when it 
comes to light? 
REP. HILL: This is the usual pattern of action 
limitations as I understand it. This is a departure 
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1 from that pattern, 
2 REP. CARR: Well, as I read the last paragraph, 
3 the next to last paragraph, as I understand, the limita-
4 tion does not apply to the person in actual possession 
5 at the time the building was constructed, 
6 REP* HILL: The time any action might be brought 
7 forth. 
8 REP* CARR: Well suppose --
9 REP* HILL: Is in actual possession at the time 
10 the defective or unsafe condition of such improvement 
11 was discovered. 
12 REP. CARR: Well how do you interpret that? 
13 That's the thing I'm getting at. 
14 REP. HILL: The purpose of that particular 
15 statement was the fact that if action, as I understand 
16 it -- as I say I'm no lawyer -- but if action was brought 
n against -- by someone who was injured on the same 
18 property because of an unsafe condition, if he didn't 
19 state that the owner was not exempted by this provision, 
20 then he would be scot-free. It might be due to his 
21 negligence on his part, but the Bill would preclude the 
22 addition of the engineer, designer or contractor as a 
23 third party to the suit, additional parties. But the 
24 owner would still -• anyone would still have action 
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against the owner or the one who had possession or 
control of the property at the time this unsafe 
3
 I condition may have caused a problem, 
4
 I REP, CARR: Well, back to this question of the time 
the defect is discovered. I'm not an engineer, and I 
don't -- it seems to me that it might be -- I think 
7
 there should be a statute of limitations on this type of 
S 
9 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
action because -- there should be limitation on every 
kind or most every kind of cause of action or legal 
10 |j liability, but I wonder about, if you're not giving the 
n I public a little more protection if you don't provide in 
12 I there, if you should not provide that a limitation period 
13
 I run from the time the defect is discovered* I wonder 
what the committee, what your thinking on that was, for 
instance if you shorten the period from 7 years to say 
2 years or 3 from the time the defect or faulty condition 
was actually discovered? 
REP. HILL: As I understand it, the present 
statute would apply on that basis, and this law is 
asking for a departure from that in that the limitation 
would begin from the time of the completion of the 
services. Now, this is not completely without precedent, 
23
 || although it is a new concept as far as the General 
24
 Statute of Limitations is concerned. 
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1 REP. CARR: As I understand it, I fm sorry to take 
2 so much time — 
3 REP. HILL: This is all right. 
4 I REP- CARR: As I understand, if the defect or if 
the injury, if the building for instance, collapsed 
6 II 8 years after construction, under this statute there 
7 would be no liability. 
3 REP. HILL: There would be no liability to the 
9 engineer or the contractor; the owner would still be 
10 held liable. 
11 REP. CARR: There would be no liability to the 
12 owner, the engineer or the architect contractor? 
13 REP. HILL: Right. Unless of course, a fraud, 
14 these type of things would still hold I fm sure, if 
15 there had been some other factors that could enter into 
16 this. I don ft believe he fs relieved scot-free, but this 
17 would preclude primarily any of these third party 
18 propositions. I might clarify this one thing just a 
19 little further if I may. We feel that there is a time 
20 testing of the design capabilities of the design that 
21 has been furnished, and if there are any major errors 
22 or omissions, the team of the designer, the owner and 
23 the contractor should be able to uncover any major ones, 
24 such as you're all familiar with, the one concerning 
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the Savings & Loan Building on Main Street. The error 
there in the combination of things that entered into it 
showed up immediately because they had some beam failures* 
This type of thing, the figure or main thing that the 
7-year period is a time test of anything that could be 
of significance* There might be some minor, I don't 
think any of us are perfect. When you say that anything 
would be perfect after passing a 7-year period, but we 
feel that the 7-year time test is adequate to protect 
the public in this case and give repose and relief to 
the peaceful attitude of the designer who knows not now 
he's held forever for that design and can be brought in 
as part of the suit should one occur. 
REP* CARR: Thank you. 
THE CHAIR: Thank you Rep. Hill. Rep. Wheeler, do 
you have something you'd like to add? 
REP. WHEELER: I'd just like to add, Mr. Speaker, 
as a member of that committee, we discussed this with 
Rep. Meecham and it came into question of fraud or 
criminal negligence and it was his -- as I understand 
the interpretation, that this wouldn't eliminate any 
charges of fraud and criminal negligence in the design 
of the building. That comes under a separate statute, 
is that right, Rep. Meecham? 
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l REP. MEECHAM: That is correct. 
2* THE CHAIR: Are you ready for the question? 
3 Any question on House Bill #4? The Chief 
4 Clerk will call the roll on House Bill 4. 
5 THE CHIEF CLERK: Agard (aye); Anderson, G.T. (aye) 
6 Anderson, R.C (aye); Arbuckle. (aye); Bagley (aye); 
7 Behennan (aye); Benson (no); Bitner (aye); Brady (aye); 
8 Bronson (aye); Brock (aye); Darver (aye); Cannon (aye); 
9 Carling (inaudible); Christenson (yes); Cox (aye); 
10 Darter (aye); Day (inaudible); Dennis (aye); Drake (aye); 
11 Eskelson (aye); Fisher (aye); Frost (inaudible); 
12 Fowler (aye); Frost (inaudible); Gilman. 
13 THE CHAIR: Rep. Gilman wishes to explain his vote. 
14 REP. GILMAN: Mr. Speaker, I think it would be nice 
15 if they'd forgive all our mistakes in 7 years, but I 
16 don't think they should be any more excused than the rest 
17 of us. I vote no. 
18 THE CHAIR: Representative Gilman votes no. 
19 THE CHIEF CLERK: Halliday (aye); Halvorsen (aye); 
20 Harding (inaudible); Howard (yes); Hill (yes); 
21 Hodgkinson (no); Holt (aye); Hunter (aye); Hebrey (aye); 
22 Jack (yes); Jones (yes); Holton (aye); Latham (yes); 
23 Lingaard (aye); Levrge (inaudible); Ludwig (no); 
24 Mather (no); Meecham (yes); Mitchell (aye); Nelson (no); 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
3 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
ru% 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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Neilson (aye); Oberhansley (no); Paste (no); Peetreson 
(inaudible); Plamp (inaudible); Powell (no); Priest (no); 
Praden (aye); Reese (aye); Regis (aye); Russell (inaudible); 
Sanders (aye); Spivey (inaudible); Sumption (no); Tire 
(no); Thurston (no); Wooter (no); Young (aye). 
Mr* Speaker* 
THE CHAIR: (Pause) House Bill #4 having received 
53 yes votes, 12 no votes, 4 absent and not voting, has 
received a constitutional majority. (Pause) 
#4 having received 53 yes votes, 12 no votes, 
4 absent and not voting, has received its constitutional 
majority and should be transmitted to the Senate for 
their further action. The Reading Clerk will now read 
House Bill #38* 
SENATE 
(inaudible) Next 53-12-25.5 (inaudible) 
, (inaudible) 
^^^ l^ie'-dfflQ-aHJmenft wis. ^ot to the committee ( i n a u d i b l e ) 
j}|r./rll/tin favor say a y e . (aye) Opposed? C a r r i e d . The 
House Amendments w i l l be found on the 25th day in the 
House Journals, 25th day in the House Journals, page 13. 
IS Ware US 
House Bill
 7^ 4 (inaudible) 
SENATOR BUCOER: Mr. President? 
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Senator Buckner. 
SENATOR BUCKNER: Mr. President we believe the 
law that -ha a booa- presented to you is one fchTa-fc—p-i.uviJ^'Sir 
for a statute of limitations for an area of our industry 
and our economy that has not formerly been completely 
covered by the law. Utah statutes today include 
some 15 or more laws that are of a limitation nature 
covering broad groups of action. However, there is no 
specific statute ottererf fur frln1 reasonable protection 
of building industry, contractors, subcontractors, 
suppliers, engineers or architects and they're now liable 
JJt u*V* -t3«TW tbo&t 
basically for a lifetime for these action^-. -And rhi.s 
fin a&** &N«Jj;*3 
-1 egia 1 ati&&==:$rnvijjejs l i a b i l i t y fo r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y or 
cm 
building defects *• be brought by 5, 10, 20, 30, 50, to 
100 years after the building basically has been completed. 
In the interest of the 25 year old building, most of 
cauJJ be-
those involved with design and construction, JjTe„Lluiy-
deceased or retired, if retired, and they can be 
completely innocent. They must, however, go through the 
I expense of defending any action to prove their innocence*, JL. 
Building (in* Inaudible) ^ 
time and therefore you (inaudible) . The 
industry believes that (inaudible) four years but 
are willing to accept the 7-year situation as being 
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1 consistent with other limitations. May I without 
2 prolonging debate just quickly point out to you that 
3 our statute of limitations now provides six years for 
* acting on a written contract, four years for acts on 
5 an oral contract and three years on trespass, injury 
S to property, fraud and estate, liability created by 
7 statute, 7-year statute for repossession of real property. 
8 So this is consistent with that, I would point out to 
9 you also that other states who have recently re-enacted 
10 the statute of limitations: Idaho passed 9 years, 
11 Illinois 6 years, Louisiana 10 years, Minnesota 10 years, 
12 I New Hampshire 6 years, North Carolina 6 years, Ohio 10 
13 I years, Tennessee 4 years, Virginia 5 years, and Wisconsin 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
•21 
o tv4 
0 * 
heirs could even be brought in*p an action where there 
is no limitation based upon the fact that when people 
sue for damages if a building has something happen to 
it, they sue everyone they can get their hands on legally. 
20 And this means the builder, the architect, the owner, 
the former owner, and anyone they can legally sue. 
22 || Consequently, I think the Bill is logical and consistent* 
23 || I would not want to prolong debate (inaudible) questions a+U Aai/«. 
24 frhii}•• n \ 7 a l o t m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n if t h e nlfljaflLog^ of t h e 
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body would like to go into it further, but in the 
interest of time, I think that basically, Mr, President, 
explains the bill.. 
Tire CLHTIK: Any further discussion on House 
Bill #4? 
H^rrnhndiblo^—. 
Are you ready for the question? 
All those in favor say aye (aye). Opposed? 
Carried, House Bill #4 having been read the second time, 
the question is shall House Bill #4 be read the third 
time? Roll call. (Inaudible) fie* *i*iel*i *ktt+ *»* ">W 
House Bill #4 shows 23 ayes, no nays, (5 absent. 
Having received a constitutional majority «*d the 
bill passes and will be referred to (inaudible) 
House Bill 0? 
House Bill 0 3 (Inaudible) 
House Bill #4 for discussion, (Inaudible) 
Are you ready for the question? All those in favor say 
aye. (aye) Opposed? Motion carried. House Bill #4 
having been read the third time and that's the final 
passage. The question is shall House Bill #4 pass? 
(inaudible) 
House Bill #4 shows a final passage, 18 ayes, 
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1 no nays, 10 absent. Having received a constitutional 
2
 majority, the bill passes and will be signed by the 
3
 President and the (inaudible) 
4
 after which it will be transmitted to the House for 
5 I the signature of the Speaker of the House. 
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